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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION-INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION: ALTERNATIVES TO THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME

CouRT-Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
Ohio, alleging that foreign corporations' were polluting Lake Erie's
waters by discharging mercury into tributaries of Lake Erie, sought to
invoke the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court by
moving for leave to file a bill of complaint. 2 Ohio desired a decree
declaring the alleged pollution a public nuisance, granting injunctive
relief, ordering removal of the mercury, and requiring payment of
damages. The Court denied the motion for leave to file the bill of
complaint. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
In declining to exercise the concurrent original jurisdiction the
Court acknowledged it possessed over the action, 3 the Supreme Court

1. Defendant corporations are the following: Wyandotte Chemicals Corporation,
incorporated in Michigan and having its principal place of business there; Dow Chemical Corp., a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is Michigan; and
Dow Chemical Corp. of Canada, incorporated in Ontario and having its principal place
of business there. Dow U.S. is involved only because it is the sole stockholder of Dow
Canada. Its Michigan facility is not accused of discharging mercury.
2. The U.S. Constitution grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in all cases
"in which a State shall be Party." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The implementing statute
gives the Supreme Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over "All controversies
between two or more States," but grants only concurrent original jurisdiction with the
state and lower federal courts over "All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State. . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970).
3. Since a state is not considered a citizen for diversity purposes, Krisel v. Duran,
386 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1042 (1968), the Supreme Court's
refusal to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction means that the action must be tried in
the state courts unless a federal question is involved. 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1970). Since
Ohio's claim is for relief from a public nuisance, Wyandotte probably does not raise a
federal question under traditional doctrine. Past decisions indicate that disputes over
navigable waterways do not raise a federal question unless the construction or application of a particular federal statute is an integral part of the plaintiffs complaint. This
principle has been applied even though the federal government has the unquestioned
power and authority to regulate each individual navigable waterway if it so elects. In
support of this reasoning see Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 (1888);
Woods v. Root, 123 F. 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1903); South Carolina v. South Carolina Elec.
& Gas Co., 41 F. Supp. 111, 115 (E.D. S. Car. 1941); Arkansas v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 171 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Ark. 1959); Adams v. California, 176 F. Supp. 456,
458-59 (N.D. Calif. 1959). On federal question jurisdiction, see C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 54-59 (2nd ed. 1970). Proposing that federal common
law should be a permissible basis for federal question jurisdiction, Wright concludes
that "pragmatic considerations" merit evaluation where federal question jurisdiction is
debatable. Id. at 58-59. On whether a dispute over navigable waters raises a federal
question, see Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 992, 1166 (1950). Despite the authority of the foregoing cases, Woods and Reed, relying on Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir.
1971), assert that a federal question is involved in the Wyandotte situation. Woods and
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recognized that time constraints preclude its unrestricted exercise of
discretionary jurisdiction. The Court justified its decision to decline
jurisdiction on three main grounds. First, state long-arm statutes guaranteed the availability of an equally unbiased and competent alterna-4
tive judicial forum with in personam jurisdiction over the parties.
Second, time-consuming factual complexities, unsuited and detrimental to the Court's primary appellate function, predominated yet
raised no serious issues of federal common, statutory, or constitutional
law. 5 Third, other conciliatory agencies involved in the dispute were
more competent to deal with the situation on a practical basis and to
resolve the whole problem, rather than judging only one aspect of it as
the Court was asked to do in the instant case."
Adopting arguendo the Court's assumption that Ohio is the proper
forum to grant relief,7 this note will examine whether the Ohio courts
and existing pollution control agencies comprise an effective mechanism to resolve the dispute, given existing law governing in personam
jurisdiction, full faith and credit, and interstate water pollution. Before
examining these issues, it will be helpful to review the Supreme
Court's past decisions to hear parens patriae actions in its original jurisdiction.
THE SUPREME COURT AND PAST PARENS PATRIAE
ACTIONS

I.

Under the doctrine of parens patriae, a sovereign state may file suit
on behalf of its citizens against another state or its residents when exReed, The Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental Quality: Some Notes on the
Wyandotte Case, 12 ARiz. L. REV. 691, 702-14 (1970). [Hereinafter cited as
Woods and Reed]. Neither Woods and Reed nor the Court in Texas v. Pankev chose to
mention the contrary case authority discussed suipra.
4.

Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 497. 500.

5. Id. at 503-04.
6. Id. at 502, 503.
7. Woods and Reed. supra note 3. evaluate the desirabilit" of the possible forums
for the resolution of the Wyandotte-type pollution dispute, and conclude that the Supreme Court, the national forum, is most desirable because of the uncertainty of the
Ohio court's jurisdiction under Ohio law, the questionable extrastate enforceability of
an Ohio injunction and the possible bias of Ohio courts against foreign industry. Woods
and Reed see the federal district courts as the second most desirable forum, and conclude that the real reason for the Wyandotte decision was the Supreme Court's fear of
overburdening its already strained docket. See I ENV. L. REP. 10038. 10041-42
(1971), which examines the Wyandotte decision, for a discussion of the disadvantages of
having any forum apply state public nuisance concepts in environmental conflicts between a state and nonresident polluters.
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trastate activity threatens the health, comfort or welfare of the plaintiff state's citizens. 8 Parenspatriae actions have been allowed when a
state complained of injury to its citizens' health and welfare caused by
pollution originating in another state. 9 Although the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction in most of these parens patriae actions has rested
on its exclusive jurisdiction over interstate controversies, 10 the Supreme Court twice has exercised original jurisdiction over parens patriae pollution suits brought by a state against citizens or corporations
of another state.'
The Supreme Court's invariable concern in deciding whether to exercise its original jurisdiction has been the availability of an impartial
alternative forum. As early as 1793,12 the Supreme Court stated that
its original jurisdiction over suits by a state against citizens of another
state existed to avoid subjecting the plaintiff state to partiality and
recrimination in the courts of a sister state. Later decisions echoed this
rationale. 13 Thus the Court's emphasis in Wyandotte on the necessity
of an unbiased alternative forum is consistent with earlier opinions.
Wyandotte seems to represent a change in the Court's views on the
burden of proving the existence of an adequate alternative forum,
however. In Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,' 4 the Court declared the lack of a proven alternative forum to be crucial to its decision to exercise its original jurisdiction; the Court heard the suit pre8. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
9. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906), in which sewage allegedly originating in
Illinois ultimately contaminated the Mississippi River in Missouri.
10. 28 U.S.C. §1251(a) (1970). E.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963);
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929);
and New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921). Concerning the Supreme Court's
exercise of original jurisdiction over parens patriae suits, see Comment, The Original
Jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV. 665 (1959); 48 N.C. L. REV.
963 (1970); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, Chapter 13 (2nd
ed. 1970); and Comment, Standing of States to Represent the Interests of their Citizens
in Federal Court, 21 AMER. U. L. REV. 224 (1971).
11. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (action to enjoin the
copper company's discharge of sulphur dioxide fumes that when mixed with air endangered Georgia's forests, orchards, and other crops); New Jersey v. City of New York,
283 U.S. 473 (1931) (action brought by New Jersey to enjoin the destruction of New
Jersey's bathing beaches caused by New York City's dumping of garbage into the
ocean).
12. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DaIl.) 419 (1793).
13. The same aversion toward compelling a state to resort to the biased courts of a
sister state and insistence upon the availability of a competent alternative forum was
articulated in Wisconsin v. Pelican, 127 U.S. 265, 289 (1888); Missouri v. Illinois, 200
U.S. 496, 520-21 (1906); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907);
Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 19 (1939).
14. 324 U.S. 439, 465-66 (1945).
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cisely because the defense had not affirmatively established that
Georgia could locate another convenient forum in which district court
jurisdiction over all the defendant corporations could be obtained.
Wyandotte is clearly contrary to Pennsylvania Railroad Co. on this
point, because the Wyandotte Court required no positive pleading and
5
proof that a viable alternative forum existed.'
The wisdom of the Court's decision in Wyandotte is contingent
upon the existence of alternative forums which can effectively resolve
the dispute. The efficacy of these forums depends upon 1) the ability
of the Ohio courts to obtain personal jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant corporations; 2) the extent to which Michigan and Canada
would honor and enforce any injunction ordered by the Ohio courts;
and 3) the adequacy of established mechanisms for water pollution
abatement.
II.

THE LONG ARM OF OHIO'S COURTS

The sole jurisdictional issue is whether Ohio can obtain in personam jurisdiction over Dow Canada. Since both Dow U.S. and
Wyandotte are licensed to do business under Ohio's laws, 16 their vulnerability to suit in Ohio's courts is not in dispute.
Invoking conventional jurisdictional principles, Ohio's courts may
seek to predicate jurisdiction over Dow Canada either upon Ohio's
acknowledged jurisdiction over Dow U.S. as the sole stockholder of
Dow Canada (control theory), 17 or upon Dow Canada's independent
contacts with Ohio (doing business theory). 18 Both of these theories

15. This tactical switch can bejustified, however. The variety of remedies now available in pollution disputes renders pleading and definite proof of the availability of an
alternative forum extremely difficult. In addition, Congressional intent to resolve such
disputes by conference and discussion at the state level is clear. See discussion of federal
pollution control procedures in Section IV, infra.
16. Ohio's Complaint at 4, 5, Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493
(1971).
17. A court may predicate jurisdiction over a nonresident subsidiary corporation
upon the presence within the court's jurisdiction of the parent corporation. See 14
WAYNE L. REV. 1228 (1968); American Compressed Steel Corp. v. Pettibone Mulliken
Corp., 271 F. Supp. 864, 867-68 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
18. Concerning the court's ability to predicate jurisdiction over a foreign corporation upon the nonresident corporation's business contacts with the forum state see
Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281
N.Y.S.2d 41, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967), noted in 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1228
(1968).
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were argued in the briefs. 19 Rather than consider whether in personam

jurisdiction in this case can be predicated on these traditional criteria,
this note will examine the more challenging issue: can Ohio predicate
jurisdiction over Dow Canada or any nonresident corporation solely
on the occurrence of tortious injury in Ohio caused by pollution originating in a foreign country or state?
Historically, in personam jurisdiction was predicated solely on
physical control over the defendant, making the defendant's presence
within the state's territory mandatory.2 0 This artificial prerequisite of
physical presence has yielded to the modem requirement that the de-

fendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state so as not
2
to offend notions of fairness, substantial justice, and due process. '
Thus, a state's long-arm legislation now is constrained only by the
constitutional mandate of due process. 22 Yet the question remains of

19. Ohio offered evidence that the corporate officers of Dow U.S. regarded Dow
Canada as one part of a unified Dow operation and that the parent/subsidiary relationship formed a sufficient jurisdictional base. Dow U.S. and Dow Canada contested the
control theory, maintaining that the Canadian plant was a totally independent entity
and that common directors and officers between the two corporations did not constitute
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. Alternatively, Ohio sought to predicate jurisdiction on
the doing business rationale by contending that 10% of Dow Canada's business consisted of exports, principally to the United States and Great Britain. The parties vehemently disputed the factual question of whether Dow Canada actively solicited business
in Ohio or was merely the passive recipient of spontaneous orders from the continental
United States. See Briefs for all parties, Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S.
493 (197 1) [hereinafter, the Briefs of the various parties in Wyandotte will be referred
to specifically].
20. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See also A. VON MEHREN & D.
TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 630-31 (1965).

21. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958). For a discussion of the evolution of principles governing a state's exercise of
jurisdiction over nonresidents see Johnson, How Minimnm is "Minimum Contact"? An
Examination of "Long Arm" Jurisdiction, 9 S. TEx. L.J. 184, 201 (1967). (Citing the
continual trend towards extending long arm jurisdiction, Johnson concludes that "In the
field of tort law, the two-edged threat of the satisfaction of the 'tortious act' and/or the
'transacting business' requirements make it extremely unlikely that a defendant, particularly a corporation, can escape service.") See also Note, In Personam Jurisdiction
Expanded: Utah's Long-Arm Statute, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 222 (1970); Note, In Personam
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: An Interest-Balancing Test, 20 U. FLA. L. REv.
33 (1967); Currie, The Growth ofthe Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533. In spite of the trend toward expanding long-arm jurisdiction, several cases have held that the 1958 Hanson decision restricted the earlier
McGee holding and thus have circumscribed state long-arm jurisdiction. Tyee Construction Co. v. Dulien Steel Products Inc., 62 Wn.2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963); Hearn v.
Dow-Bodische Chemical Co., 224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 1963); O'Brien v. Comstock
Foods, 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
22. See 2TEX. TECH. L. REv. 328 (1971).
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when due process is violated by eager state courts exercising long-arm
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has not effectively circumscribed the authority
of state legislatures to base in personam jurisdiction solely on a tortious

act in one state which produces harmful consequences in the forum

state. 23 Testing the extent of their jurisdictional reach, several states
by statutory and decisional law have predicated jurisdiction solely on
the occurrence within the forum state of the injurious consequences of
a tortious act committed in a sister state.2 4 A recent decision which
indicates the permissible scope of state long-arm jurisdiction over a
corporation of a foreign nation is Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth.2 5 In that case Maui Island Tours ordered tour buses from
Haleakala Motors, a Hawaiian firm, which transmitted the order to
Vauxhall Ltd. of England. Vauxhall manufactured the chassis for the
buses, and then had another English firm, Duple Motors, construct
the bodies. The court held that Duple's construction of the bodies with

23. Blount v. T. D. Publishing Corp., 77 N.M. 384, 423 P.2d 421 (1966), a suit for
invasion of privacy, indicates the extreme to which state courts have gone in extending
long-arm jurisdiction to the limits of due process. In Blount the court found a regular
distribution plan to be a sufficient contact under New Mexico's long-arm statute to establish jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania magazine publisher, the primary distributor
who purchased the publisher's magazines in New York, and the independent New
Mexico wholesale distributor, one of many such independent distributors throughout the
United States. No other contacts with New Mexico were alleged. The Blount decision
was noted in 8 NAT. RES. J. 348 (1968). Accord, Bibie v. T. D. Publishing Corp., 252 F.
Supp. 285 (N.D. Calif. 1966).
24. Most notable are the product liability cases, exemplified by Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), in which
the defendant's only contact with the forum state was the foreseeable presence there of
its defective product as a result of the defendant's placing that product into normal interstate commercial channels. These cases are directly relevant to an interstate pollution
controversy, because the extrastate torts of manufacturing a defective product and polluting a navigable waterway are clearly analogous. The following are among the many
cases that have upheld the rationale of the Gray case: Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co..
426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970), noted in 2 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 328 (1971); Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969); Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass
Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1967), noted in 8 ARIz. L. REv. 356 (1967); MetalMatic, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 82 Nev. 263, 415 P.2d 617 (1966); Golden
Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 66 Wn.2d 469, 403 P.2d 351 (1965).
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1025 (1966). Contra: Feathers v. McLucas. 15 N.Y.2d 443. 209
N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965). Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wn.2d 875,
425 P.2d 647 (1967), noted in 44 WASH. L. REV. 490 (1969); O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. Smith,
120 Ga. App. 106, 169 S.E.2d 827 (1969), noted in 6 GA. Sr. BAR J. 202 (1969);
Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165 (D.C. Minn. 1969),
noted in 36 J. AIR LAW & COMM. 346 (1970) (criticized). See generally Comment, In
Personain Juirisdiction over Nonresident Mantfacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63
MICH. L. REV. 1028 (1965).

25.

538

417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).

Original Jurisdiction
the knowledge that the buses ultimately were destined for Hawaii
constituted sufficient contact with the forum to satisfy due process
requirements and establish jurisdiction under Hawaii's long-arm
statute. 26 The tenuous nature of the foreign defendant's contact with
the forum state in Duple certainly suggests that the more direct relation between Dow Canada and Ohio forms a constitutionally sufficient jurisdictional base.
Although no case has yet predicated jurisdiction solely on pollution
originating outside of the forum, 27 such a jurisdictional base would
seem to satisfy due process requirements. In the products liability
area, the courts have weighed such elements as inconvenience to the
parties, the interest of the forum state in the litigated subject, and the
desire for efficient judicial administration 28 in determining whether
long-arm jurisdiction preserves the defendant's constitutional right to
29
due process.
The only remaining justification for withholding jurisdiction over
the nonresident polluter is the fear that he will be subjected to inequitable treatment by biased courts of a sister state. 30 This fear superficially appears to be borne out by the Wyandotte case, for the undisputed facts suggest that Ohio is indeed biased in its efforts to obtain a
judgment against Wyandotte and Dow. While taking no action against
Ohio corporations which are known to pollute Lake Erie with mercury,3 1 Ohio instituted the instant suit even though Dow Canada im26.

Duple was compelled to defend itself in Hawaii in a suit for negligent manufac-

ture brought by a passenger who was injured when one of the buses skidded off the
highway and overturned while being operated by Maui Island Tours.
Duple has been noted in 24 Sw. LJ. 532 (1970). Another note on Duple, 12 B.C. IND.
& COMM. L. REV. 130, 133 (1970), considered the application of domestic due process
standards ill advised in the international situation, deeming Duple an ". . . unfair exten-

sion of the liberalized jurisdictional rule to a foreign defendant." Compare Velandra v.
Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1964), in which jurisdiction
over the French manufacturer of Renault automobiles was denied in an analogous situation.
27.

See I ENv. L. REP. 10038, 10039 (1971), which suggests that Wyandotte may

imply the Court's willingness to uphold long-arm jurisdiction when the nonresident defendant's only contact with the forum state is the extraterritorial discharge of pollutants
which ultimately contaminate interstate waters in the forum state.
28. These factors are identified, discussed, and approved in 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 33
(1967), supra note 21, at 37.
29. See 8 NAT. RES. J. 348 (1968), in which the author identifies 1) avoidance of
unreasonable hardship on the defendant, 2) existence of minimum contacts with the
forum and 3) foreseeability of injury in the forum as essential to assure due process.
30. See Woods and Reed, supra note 3, at 696.
31. Brief of Dow Canada in Reply at 8, 15, Appendix V; Brief of Dow Canada in
Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 9.
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plemented radical steps to abate its mercury pollution as soon as its
harmful effects became known. 32 Other known mercury polluters
were not even joined. 33 Ohio apparently desired the defendant corporations to pay for the total removal of mercury from Lake Erie, 34
although there was great doubt whether any mercury from Dow Canada's Sarnia plant reached Ohio waters. 35 Moreover, scientists themselves do not know how to clean up existing mercury pollution. 36
Even hypothesizing state court bias, however, the Wyandotte decision has merit. The fear of state court bias should be dispelled by
the realization that a nonresident corporation which has been treated
unfairly can obtain Supreme Court review. 37 The Supreme Court is
better equipped to function as an appellate rather than original tribunal, and it can more easily detect forum state bias after the facts of
the case have been distilled in a prior adjudication. Wyandotte merely
withholds the originaljurisdiction of the Supreme Court, not appellate
review.
Forum state harm caused by extrastate pollution presents an even
more compelling case for state long-arm jurisdiction than does the
negligent manufacture of a defective product. Defective products
usually threaten only a few persons; pollution, by contrast, can detrimentally affect a major segment of a state's population. To deny jurisdiction is to assert that so long as a nonresident corporation scrupu32. Brief of Dow Canada in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint at
7-8. 33-34. Appendices VI and VII; Brief of Dow Canada in Reply at 4. In their briefs
Ohio and Dow Canada bicker over whether Dow is continuing to discharge a small
amount of mercury; but the undisputed facts show that Dow Canada immediately cemented shut its mercury-disgorging conduit until its production processes could be altered to abate the pollution (Brief of Dow Canada in Opposition to Motion for Leave to
File Complaint at 7). and that Dow Canada now has reduced its pollution from thirty
pounds of mercury per day to less than one pound (Brief of Ohio in Support of the
Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 2-3, Appendix II). a smaller discharge than scientists throughout the world previously had thought possible (Brief of Dow Canada in
Reply at 5-7).
33. Brief of Dow Canada in Reply at 2, 15. Brief of Dow U.S. in Reply to Brief of
the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 6.
34. Brief of Dow Canada in Reply at 16-17.
35. Id. at 14.
36. Brief of Dow Canada in Reply at 9. Dredging, originally thought to be a panacea, may cause more damage than leaving the lake alone. Id. at 9-10: Brief of Dow
Canada in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 10.
37. Harlan explicitly expressed the Supreme Court's concern to guarantee that
Ohio's courts render an impartial judgment: ". . . this Court... if called upon to assess
the validity of any decree rendered against either Dow Canada or Wyandotte, would be
alert to ascertain whether the judgment rested upon an even-handed application of justice .. ." Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 500.
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lously avoids all business contact with another state, it may freely
dump its refuse, however noxious, with utter lack of concern for residents of the adjacent state. Judicial sanction of such a principle would
encourage corporations to locate upstream or upwind from neighboring states and to market their products everywhere but in the state
which has been selected as the receptacle for their industrial wastes.
Although it appears that Ohio may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over Dow Canada, there still remains the question of whether
Ohio statutes as presently worded enable her to obtain this jurisdiction. The relevant portion of Ohio's long-arm statute provides for
out-of-state service of process upon any nonresident corporation
38
which causes:
.. tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state
if [the corporation] does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered in this state.
In requiring certain minimum contacts with Ohio in addition to the
tortious injury therein,3 9 the Ohio law is more conservative than stat-

38. OHIo R. Civ. P. 4.3(A)(4) (1971).
39. Most cases under the relevant long-arm provision are federal district court diversity cases. The only decision rendered by an Ohio state court construing Ohio's
long-arm statute is McHugh v. Prestodial, Inc., 45 Ohio Op. 2d 97, 241 N.E.2d 102 (C.
P. Hamilton Cty., 1968), which is not directly in point because no tortious injury to
Ohio citizens was involved. The decision is significant, however, because the judge listed
four factors which were important to his decision:
1. No representative or agent of the defendant ever came into Ohio.
2. In essence, it was a solitary business transaction....
3. The money value of the transaction ($4,475.00) was not substantial....
4. There was no tortious injury to anyone in this state....
Id., 241 N.E.2d at 104. In Stewart v. Bus & Car Co., 293 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ohio
1968), the court explicitly construed the Ohio long-arm rule as narrower than the Illinois
rule established by the Gray decision, supra at note 24. The Ohio district court held that
an Ohio long-arm clause identical to the current rule (see text accompanying note 38,
supra) required additional contacts with Ohio if all the defendant's tortious activities
occurred outside of the state. See also Didactics Corp. v. Welch Scientific Co., 291 F.
Supp. 890 (N.D. Ohio 1968); Moriarty v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp.
381 (S.D. Ohio 1967). Compare the following Ohio federal district court decisions
construing Ohio's long-arm statute to obtain an understanding of what the Ohio federal
district courts think the Ohio state courts would consider to be sufficient minimum contacts within the limits of due process: Seilon, Inc. v. Brema S.p.A., 271 F. Supp. 516
(N.D. Ohio 1967); American Compressed Steel Corp. v. Pettibone Mulliken Corp., 271
F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Busch v. Service Plastics, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.
Ohio 1966) (The court upheld jurisdiction in products liability action for tortious injury
where defendant nonresident corporation had systematic business contacts with Ohio
and derived substantial revenue from goods sold to an Ohio corporation, where the subsequent sale of those products to Ohio consumers reasonably should have been fore-
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utes which have been found constitutional in previous product liability
decisions 40 and seems consonant with the minimum contacts, substantial justice, and fair play requirements advocated by the Supreme
41
Court.
To obtain jurisdiction over nonresident polluters, the Ohio courts
42
might liberalize the previous interpretation of Ohio's long-arm statute
by deeming the tortious injury itself the required minimum contact.
Such a liberalization appears constitutionally warranted by the trend
toward increasing in personam jurisdictional reach by the state courts,
although the conservative inclination of the Ohio courts and legislature evidenced by past decisions and the wording of the Ohio
long-arm statute might cause the Ohio courts to decline jurisdiction. If
jurisdiction were denied on constitutional (due process) grounds, Ohio
could appeal that decision, and the Supreme Court has impliedly
committed itself to sustain the constitutionality of Ohio court jurisdiction by its own decision to decline jurisdiction over Wyandotte. However, if the Ohio courts simply decided that the Ohio statute did not
permit them to exercise jurisdiction, plaintiff Ohio could then move
for leave to file another bill of complaint in the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, offering to prove that the theoretical alternative
forum which justified the Supreme Court's denial of jurisdiction did
not in fact exist.
Assuming satisfactory resolution of the jurisdictional issue, it is now
necessary to consider the extrastate enforceability of an Ohio court's
decree.
III.

THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
OHIO'S JUDGMENT

ENFORCEABILITY OF

The discussion here will be confined to the enforceability of Ohio's
judgment in a sister state. Enforcement in Canada of any United States
decree, whether rendered by Ohio or by the United States Supreme
seen). Note that in McHugh v. Prestodial, Inc., the court noted the Busch decision and
explicitly approved some of its language. McHugh, 241 N.E.2d at 104.
40. Compare products liability cases cited in note 24, ,upra.
41. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also 35 U. CIN.
L. REv. 157, 164-65 (1966).

42. One decision suggests that a change in interpretation might not be required. See
Didactics Corp. v. Welch Scientific Co., 291 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Ohio 1968), construing
Ohio's long-arm statute as coextensive with the due process requirements of the Federal
Constitution. But see note 39. supra.
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Court, depends upon Canada's willingness to honor the judgment43 for
reasons of convenience and utility under the principles of comity.
The U.S. Constitution requires states to give full faith and credit to
the "public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State,"4 4 to secure the benefits of national unity in a federal system by
assuring that judgments will be given uniform effect throughout the
nation.4 5 Judicial interpretation of the full faith and credit clause and
its implementing statute46 has not been easy. The general rule47 is that
full faith and credit must be granted to any final judgment48 resulting
from judicial proceedings in which the parties have obtained a decision on the merits from an unprejudiced court possessing jurisdiction
over the parties and subject matter.4 9 Money judgments generally are
deemed enforceable in a sister state, although such judgments need
not be enforced by a sister forum if:50 1) the suit is barred by the
second forum's statute of limitations, 2) the second state does not have
the power to hear suits between the parties to the judgment, and possibly if 3) the underlying cause of action is penal in nature. Aside from

43.

See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); A. VON MEHREN & D.

TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 34-37, 834 (1965);

12 B.C.

IND.

COMM. L. REV. 130, 134 (1970). On the recognition of internationally foreign judgments, see Von Mehren and Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A
Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601 (1968). See also The Salton Sea Cases, 172 F. 792 (9th Cir. 1909).
44. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
45. Avins and Rosenberg, The Full Faith and Credit Clause In the U.S. Constitution: An Instrument of Federalism, 6 WASHBURN LJ. 96 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Avins and Rosenberg]. The article discusses ". .. the manner in which the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution promotes a harmonious federalism within the context
of a rightful respect for the right of individual states." Id. at 97. See also Nadelmann,
Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33 (1957).
46. 28 UJ.S.C.1§73-8 (1970). The implementing'stfatute provides- iiat authenticated
copies of a state's judicial proceedings "shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States... as they have by law or usage" in the court which rendered the judgment.
47. Avins and Rosenberg, supra note 45, at 98, 112 (1966); Averill, Choice-of-Law
Problems Raised by Sister State Judgments and the Full Faith and Credit Mandate, 64
Nw. U.L. REV. 686, 687 (1970).
48. See Hendrix v. Hendrix, 160 Conn. 98, 273 A.2d 890 (1970); and RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 107 (1971) on requirement of finality. See also Barber
v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910); Lynde v. Lynde, 181
U.S. 183 (1901).
49. See Midessa Television Co. v. Motion Pictures for Television, Inc., 290 F.2d
203 (5th Cir. 1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 104 (1971); and
Avins and Rosenberg, supra note 45, at 102-03. See also Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n,,283 U.S. 522 (1931); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
50. Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IOWA L. REV. 183,
185 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Reese].
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these narrow exceptions, 5 ' full faith and credit must be given to judgments at law.
Despite the constitutional mandate, courts have been reluctant to
give full faith and credit to foreign equity decrees. 52 This reluctance
originated in the anachronistic belief that judgments at law were superior to equity decrees and that an equity decree made its subject responsible only to the issuing court.A3 Nevertheless, subject to the foregoing requirements, equity decrees which order the payment of
money or the alteration of a status (e.g., marital status by divorce)
consistently have been accorded the resjudicataeffect of full faith and
credit in sister states under modern law. 5 4 Thus if Ohio obtained a
final judgment on the merits, clearly she could secure payment of any
damages awarded by bringing an action on the judgment debt in any
51. In addition to the above exceptions, predominant forum state interest or overriding national interest occasionally may limit the application of the full faith and credit
doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1971). See also
Reese, supra note 50. at 201. where the author formulates an exception to full faith and
credit based on a national interest in procuring the child's best interest in child custody
cases. In the Wyandotte situation. Michigan would not seem to have a predominant interest which would preclude the enforcement of an Ohio injunction, although its courts
might be tempted to assert such an interest to protect profitable Michigan industries.
Such an explicit assertion would not appear to have much to commend it on appeal.
however. Michigan would have great difficulty persuading the Supreme Court that
Michigan's business interests must prevail to the detriment of citizens of both Michigan
and Ohio. See Fauntleroy v. Lum. 210 U.S. 230 (1908). which held that a Missouri judgment was entitled to full faith and credit even though it infringed on the interests of the
forum state. Mississippi. See also Comment, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments: Law
and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 282. 287-89. 291
(1966). in which the author contends that case law does not justify the Restatement § 103
exception, and that the exception would be detrimental to the federal system.
52. Ohio perhaps could avoid the problem of full faith and credit enforceability of
equitable decrees by placing the defendants in contempt of court and levying a large
contempt fine if they refused to comply with Ohio's injunction to stop polluting. While
contempt judgments generally are entitled to full faith and credit, as are all money judgments (see text accompanying notes 50 and 54). the contempt decree might not be enforceable to the extent that the Michigan court deemed it to be an excessive. penal assessment. On the existence of a possible penal law exception to full faith and credit enforceability, see Avins and Rosenberg. supra note 45. at 100: Attrill v. Huntington. 70
Md. 191, 16 A. 651 (1889): Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York. 224 N.Y. 99. 120
N.E. 198 (1918). The Supreme Court, however, has never explicitly refused to require
full faith and credit because of the penal nature of a judgment. Using the contempt decree as an avenue of escape for Ohio from the dubious enforceability of its injunction
appears to be only a precarious hope, since I) it makes Michigan's appraisal of Ohio's
assessment pivotal, 2) any contempt fine high enough to make the defendants stop polluting would almost certainly be vulnerable to attack as penal, and 3) payment of a
lesser, clearly non-penal contempt fine would probably not cause the defendants to stop
polluting.
53.
Reese, supra note 50. at 189-90: A. VON
LAW OF M ULTIsTA E PROBLEMS 992 (1965).

54.
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Keese. supra note 50, at 192: Avins and Rosenberg. supra note 45. at 99.
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other state with jurisdiction over the judgment debtor's person or
55
property.
The problem is the degree of recognition that should be accorded
other types of equitable decrees. 5 6 In the absence of a definitive Supreme Court opinion, it remains uncertain whether a valid Ohio decree enjoining the defendants from performing certain acts (i.e., discharging mercury) is entitled to full faith and credit. While courts
generally are divided on the issue, 57 several state court decisions explicitly state that full faith and credit applies equally to law and equity
decrees. 58 Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
an equitable decree would be entitled to full faith and credit,5 9 the
weight of modern authority indicates that a valid injunction would be
60
enforceable in another state.

55. Reese, supra note 50, at 185. Note that in Michigan the procedure would be
even less complex, for Michigan has adopted a Uniform Foreign Money Judgments
Recognition Act, MICH. STAT. ANN. §27.955 (1-9) (1971), which renders a valid foreign
money judgment conclusive and enforceable without further court proceedings, much as
a district court monetary judgment becomes enforceable in other districts merely by
registration thereof. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970).
56. See, e.g., Philadelphia Baseball Club Co. v. Lajoie, 13 Ohio Dec. 504 (C.P. Cuyahoga Cty., 1902).
57. For a list of authorities on both sides of the issue see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS §102, Reporter's Note to comments c and d (1971) (land convey-

ance).
58. E.g., McElroy v. McElroy, 256 A.2d 763, 765 (Del. 1969); and especially Rich
v. Con-Stan Industries, 449 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. 1969), noted in 2 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 137
(1970), in which the court deemed enforcement of a permanent California injunction
against the unauthorized use of two registered trademarks required by full faith and
credit. The court explicitly stated:
...insofar as the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution is concerned,
there is no difference between an equitable decree and other judgments. We think
the full faith and credit clause applies to all valid, final judgments of another state.
Rich, 449 S.W.2d at 325.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102, comment c (1971).
60. Avins and Rosenberg, supra note 45, at I01. Subject to the requirements of
finality, jurisdiction, and due process discussed supra, the courts consistently have expanded the applicability of full faith and credit to foreign decrees ordering the conveyance of land, the payment of alimony or child support, and the transfer of child custody.
On decrees ordering the conveyance of land, by far the majority of courts uphold the

enforceability of a sister state decree in the forum state. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102, comment d (1971); and Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 92
NJ. Super. 18, 222 A.2d 120, 125 (1966). Compare Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909),
discussed in Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CHI. L. REV.
620, 635-37 (1965). See also cases collected in A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN,
THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 1485-1591 (1965) on the application of the

full faith and credit doctrine to divorce, support, alimony, and child custody decrees.
Withdrawing its previous contention that a valid injunction was unenforceable in a
sister state, the Restatement now states that:
A valid judgment that orders the doing of an act other than the payment of money,
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Perhaps the most cogent argument 'that both Michigan and the
Supreme Court on appeal would deem an Ohio injunction enforceable
is the simple fact that there is no constitutional or statutory authority
for limiting the constitutional mandate of full faith and credit.15t
Wyandotte may imply the Court's willingness to require extrastate
enforcement of a state court's injunction; 2 it makes nonsense of the
Wyandotte decision to hypothesize that the Supreme Court subsequently would refuse to require Michigan to enforce an injunction issued by Ohio's courts, when the Supreme Court's whole rationale implicitly depends upon the Ohio court's ability to render and enforce a
judgment as effective as that of the Supreme Court.
Thus the Supreme Court was probably correct in assuming that the
Ohio courts can obtain jurisdiction over all the defendant corporations and issue an enforceable judgment. An examination of possible
alternative remedies and forums available to Ohio other than a public
nuisance action in its state courts is now necessary.
IV.

FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
PROCEDURES

In recent years the federal governmentO3 has made substantial progor that enjoins the doing of an act, may be enforced, or be the subject of remedies
in other states.
RESTATEMEN-] (SECOND) OF CON rLtC OF LAWS § 102 (1971) (emphasis added). The
comment to that section, noting the absence of a definitive statement by the Supreme
Court, adopted a wait-and-see approach regarding required enforceability of a sister
state's injunction. The Supreme Court's decision in Wyandotte may be the official sanction the commentator awaited.
61. See Ferster v. Ferster, 220 Ga. 319, 138 S.E.2d 674 (1964); RESATAEMENI
(SECOND) OF CONFIICI OF LAWS § 102, comment c (1971); and Rich v. Con-Stan
Industries, 449 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Tex. 1969), where the court concluded:
We do not find any language in either Sec. I of Art. 4 of the U.S. Constitution or
Sec. 1738 of Title 28 U.S.C.A., that in our opinion could be construed as excluding
permanent injunction judgments from being entitled to full faith and credit.
See also 2TEX. TECH. L. REV. 137 (1970).
62. Although full faith and credit was not discussed in the Wyandotte decision, the
uncertain enforceability of any decision ultimately rendered by the Supreme Court
against Dow Canada, if it chose to assert jurisdiction, was urged as a reason for declining original jurisdiction. See Brief of Dow Canada in Opposition to Motion for
Leave to File Complaint at 35. Since the issue of the enforceability of the U.S. Supreme
Court's own judgment was briefed, it would appear that the Supreme Court considered
the possible problem of enforceability of Ohio's decree, and consciously elected to regard that problem as insubstantial. Since the issue was not explicitly before the court,
however, the court may not have reached this issue.
63. Although agencies other than those created pursuant to the federal water pollution control law are involved in regulating pollution which affects Lake Erie (i.e..
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ress in enacting water pollution control law. 64 The water quality legislation authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] to
encourage the development of water quality standards pursuant to the
express national goal of abating water pollution. 65 The theme of the
water quality legislation is federal-state and interstate cooperation,"6
with emphasis on local responsibility for water pollution control. 67
The statutes establish detailed provisions for coordination of federal
and state authority, provisions which induce state cooperation by
grounding federal "encouragement" on the government's ultimate
authority to exact penalties68 and institute court action 69 to procure
enforcement of water quality standards. There is no question of federal preemption of the regulation of pollution of interstate or navigable waters, however, for Congress explicitly stated its purpose: "...
to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and
rights of the States in preventing and controlling water pollution. '70
Since federal water pollution law clearly favors state enforcement,7 1
Michigan Water Resources Commission, Ontario Water Resources Commission, and
the International Joint Commission established by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909;
Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 502-03), those agencies would not help Ohio to obtain abatement of the specific acts of pollution which Ohio protests. Not only has Dow Canada
complied with the regulations established by the Ontario Water Resources Council
(Brief of Dow Canada in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 33,
Appendices VI and VII), but out-of-state regulatory agencies would probably not react
favorably to Ohio's request until Ohio forced its own industries to comply with the stringent standards it seeks to impose on the nonresident corporations. See discussion in text
accompanying notes 31-35, supra.
64. Most of that law now is codified as 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151-60 (1970). This law has
been altered by executive order so that the authority granted therein now belongs to the
newly created Environmental Protection Agency instead of to the Secretary of the Interior. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 FED. REG. 15623 (1970). See also 33
U.S.C.A. § 1165 (1970), which specifically authorizes water pollution control projects for
the Great Lakes area.
65. 33 U.S.C.A. § 115 l(a) (1970). The primary authority to create and enforce water
pollution standards, however, rests with the states. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151(b), 1151(c),
S1I60(b) (1970).
66. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1154 (1970).
67. The EPA's power to prepare water quality regulations is totally contingent
upon state default in setting standards adequate "to protect the public health or welfare,
enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes" of the water quality legislation. 33
U.S.C.A. § 1160(c)(3) (1970). Pursuant to the federal statutes, both Ohio and Michigan
adopted water quality standards applicable to Lake Erie which have been deemed to
meet the criteria of the federal water pollution control legislation. See 18 C.F.R. §
620.10 (1971).
68. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ i 160(d)(3), i 160(k)(2) (1970).
69. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1160(g) (1970).
70. 33 U.S.C.A. § 115l(b)(1970).
71. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151(b), 1151(c), 1160(b) (1970). See Abkin, Federal Programs
for Water Pollution Control, I U.C. DAvis L. REV. 71, 100-03 (1969) for a criticism of
the federal legislation's emphasis on local control and its relegation of the federal government to a secondary, supportive role.
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federal procedures exist only as a last resort in the event no state elects
to file suit to enforce state water pollution regulations. A court action
to secure abatement on behalf of the United States, moreover, is contingent upon both the independent decision of the EPA to proceed
and voluntary action by the U.S. Attorney General.7 2 In enforcing
federally approved water pollution control standards, compliance has
been obtained primarily through conference and the impact of public
73
opinion rather than through court action.
Because conference and discussion are its primary tools and because of the discretion vested in the EPA administrator,7 4 the legislation has obvious deficiencies if one's goal is rapid and mandatory curtailment of pollution. Administrative remedies nevertheless seem preferable to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In providing
for the initial investigation of the facts by an agency which is expert in
such discovery, administrative procedures shield the Supreme Court
from performing the role of fact finder in the complex area of water
pollution, while they do not necessarily preclude ultimate judicial review of the agency's determination. 75 Further, the provision for discretionary federal enforcement does not preclude state enforcement of
76
water quality regulations through court action.
Thus, avenues to court action other than original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court are available to a state adversely affected by pollution
originating in another state. 77 Not only may the aggrieved state bring

72. After giving a violator 180 days notice, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1160(c)(5) (1970), the
EPA administrator may (with written consent of the governor required if the breach of
the pollution standards endangers only the citizens of the state where the discharge occurs) request the U.S. Attorney General to bring suit against the violator on behalf of
the United States. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1160(g) (1970).
73. See S. DEGLER & S. BLOOM, FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAMS: WATER.
AIR. AND SoL ID WASTES 6, 7 (1969). Degler and Bloom report that of 45 cases in which

conferences have been convened to enforce water pollution control standards. only
three have proceeded to public hearings and only one to court action. Eleven have been
resolved in compliance with the federal government's recommendations, twenty are
achieving progress satisfactory to the federal government, and thirteen are still pending.
Degler and Bloom discuss enforcement procedures and list the current status of 46 enforcement actions under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Id. at 47-53.
74. For a criticism of the federal enforcement procedure and an indictment of its
deficiencies, see J. BRECHER & M. NESTLE. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 221-22.
223-24 (1970).
75. See discussion in Section V, infra.
76. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text. stupra.
77. For a general discussion of procedures and problems attendant upon environmental litigation, seeJ. BRECHER & M. NESTLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 93-145
(1970).
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an action in its own or the offending state's courts on a public nuisance theory; it also may seek redress at the state court level based on
violation of federally sanctioned state or interstate water quality regulations (probably indirectly by seeking review of an administrative
determination by the cognizant state water pollution control agency).78
In addition the state may seek direct assistance from the EPA.7 9 Since
the courts thus appear to be available at the state level, providing litigants with the ultimate recourse of Supreme Court review, exercise of
the original rather than the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is not justified in the Wyandotte situation where the plaintiff
has not even sought relief at the state level before petitioning the Supreme Court.
V.

THE ELUSIVE FORUM

The ominous possibility remains, however, that the alternative
forums theoretically available to Ohio and other plaintiffs with similar
grievances will not materialize. The disturbing hypothetical unfolds as
follows. Ohio first might obtain in personam jurisdiction and bring an
action in its state courts. The Ohio state courts nevertheless might
refuse to entertain the public nuisance suit, asserting that a federal or
state agency bears the primary responsibility for water pollution
abatement. 80 Ohio then could request the EPA administrator8 1 to file

78. Such judicial review is authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1970), which provides that: "A person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." But see notes 84-85 and accompanying text, infra.
79. A state's governor or water pollution control agency may initiate the EPA enforcement procedure by requesting the EPA administrator to convene a conference
concerning the extrastate pollution which is endangering the requesting state's citizens.
See 33 U.S.C. § 160(d)(I)(1970).
80. The Ohio courts could justify this action by the doctrine of primaryjurisdiction
which enables courts to defer action until the problem is reviewed by the cognizant
agency. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 363-64 (1965). Once a dispute is referred
to the proper administrative agency, an aggrieved party's only possible recourse is court

review of the administrative agency's resolution; the court will not examine the controversy anew. For a chart of the agencies which perform water management functions in

Ohio see OHIO
4(1963).

WATER COMM'N, RECOMMENDATIONS ON WATER POLICY AND LEGISLATION

81. Ohio could also request the appropriate state official to take action to exact
compliance with the federally approved state regulations if interstate pollution were not
involved. A process analogous to that described in the remainder of this paragraph of
the text could then occur under state administrative law.
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suit in the name of the United States against the polluters charged
with violating the EPA-approved water quality regulations. The EPA
administrator, in his discretion, might decide not to request the Attorney General to bring an action on behalf of the United States.
Undaunted, Ohio could return to its federal district courts, seeking review of the EPA's decision not to file SUit.82 The courts again might
refuse to hear Ohio's complaint, this time asserting that the EPA administrator's authority to bring an action is made discretionary by law8 3
and as such falls within the statutory exception 84 to the general
85
right to review of agency actions.
This circuitous denial of access to the courts could occur; 86 the
elaborate statutorily established mechanisms for solving water pollution disputes which justify the Supreme Court's refusal to hear Ohio's
case conceivably could become an administrative quagmire in which
Ohio might be denied her day in court. 87 That result clearly would be
contrary to the viable alternative forum principle wisely formulated
82.
83.

Administrative Procedure Act. 5 L .S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970).
33 U.S.C.A. § 1160(g) (1970).

84.

5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970). See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5 13-14 (1965).

where Davis states that when the right to initiate proceedings is committed by law to
agency discretion, the decision not to proceed is unreviewable. Davis remarks:
But deficiency of administrative zeal may be as grievous a fault as excessive zeal.
although silent inaction seldom hits the headlines. One of the greatest dangers of the
administrative process is that an agency through lethargy or through immoderate
yielding to the influence of the regulated groups may thwart the democratic will by
acting only when prodded by private interest.
Id. at 79.
85. See Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line. Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 317 (1958). In Bishop
Processing Co. v. Gardner, 375 F.Supp 780 (Md. 1967), the court refused to review the decisions of a hearing board under the Clean Air Act because the alleged polluter would obtain judicial review if the Secretary of H.E.W., exercising his statutory
discretion, elected to file suit on behalf of the United States. See also Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1967). and cases
cited therein. See generally Miller, Ecology and the Administrative Process. 23 ADNIIN.
L. REV. 59 (1970).

86.

That discretionary agency refusal to prosecute is a very real problem is pointed

out in K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 212-13 (1970). where Davis notes that review

of an administrative officer's decision not to prosecute may be obtained only if it is a
patent abuse of discretion, citing Moog Industries v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411. 414 (1958).
Labor law cases supporting Davis' conclusion include: Hourihan v. NLRB, 201 F.2d
187 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Div. 1267. Street, Electric Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v.
Ordman, 320 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Local 954. Retail Clerks International Ass'n v.
Rothman. 298 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306 (Ist Cir.
1948).
87. See Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environniental Lawyer in the Wilderne.ss of
Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 629 (1970). Advocating a relaxation of
restrictions on judicial review of administrative decisions. Sive maintains that ultimately
the courts are more competent to weigh and balance conflicting social policies and economic interests so prevalent in environmental disputes.
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by the Supreme Court over the years, and that result just as clearly
would transform Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. into an entirely
different case. Wyandotte's message is that alternative mechanisms
whose usual function is the initial resolution of water pollution or
public nuisance disputes should be exhausted first; if those other
forums are denied to a plaintiff state whose citizens are threatened by
a nonresident corporation's pollution, the Wyandotte decision implies
that the aggrieved state then would have a cogent argument for the
Supreme Court's exercise of original jurisdiction.
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